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The question of how to structure and package the residential 
experience is a deeply interesting and difficult one. How physically large 
or small should residential holdings be? How densely should they be 
clustered? Should spaces for working, recreating, cooking, and bathing 
be contained within the private residential unit, shared with other 
households, or procured á la carte? How permanent should the 
connection be between a household and a living space? How much 
control should households have over the environment surrounding the 
dwelling unit? Answers to these and many other queries differ both 
within and between societies. Housing services can be provided in an 
almost infinite array of configurations, from capsule hotels1 to large 
estate homes situated on extensive private grounds. 
A law and economics perspective that fully attends to problems of 
scale can inform the task of configuring residential property optimally. 
Like other forms of private property, housing entitlements mark off 
resources from the rest of the world and delegate broad decisionmaking 
power over them to individuals and groups.2 Deciding how thickly or 
thinly to carve up housing resembles other boundary-drawing problems, 
such as determining the optimal scope of a firm or a farm.3 In each case, 
                                                        
 
 1  Capsule hotels provide a small plastic pod (roughly 6 ½ feet long by 5 feet wide) for 
an individual to sleep in, along with lockers for belongings, and communal bathing 
and eating facilities. Although the hotels' primary clientele was initially businessmen 
who had missed their last train home, these hotels began to be used during the 
recession by long-term guests who rented by the month. Hiroko Tabuchi, For Some in 
Japan, Home Is a Tiny Plastic Bunk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A1.  
 2  Henry Smith has associated property rule protection and strong exclusion rights with 
broad delegations to owners. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules 
in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 974, 978-85 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, 
Exclusion]; Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 
1755-64 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules].  
 3  See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332-34 (1993) 
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the appropriate size and composition of the holding depends on the scale 
of the underlying activities. 4  Identifying the relevant scale for 
residential activity is not easy, however. Housing serves a number of 
distinct goals,5 and it can be delivered through a variety of property 
formats.6  It also plays a crucial role in rationing access to other 
important goods and services, including education and public safety. An 
analytic perspective that emphasizes scale illuminates the ways in which 
law intersects with private decisionmaking to deliver housing. Central to 
this analysis is the mutability of the functions served by housing. The 
law, as part of a generative process that interacts with private markets 
and household decisions, can profoundly influence what happens inside 
and outside the envelope of the home. 
                                                                                                                              
 
(describing the challenge of setting “efficient boundaries” and the attendant tradeoffs 
between “internal management” and “external coordination”); Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (papers and proceedings) 
347, 358 (1967) (“The greater are diseconomies of scale to land ownership the more 
will contractual arrangement be used by the interacting neighbors to settle [their] 
differences.”); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, N.S. 386 
(1937), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33, 44 
(1988) (discussing efficient boundaries for a firm). 
 4  See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1322-35. 
 5  There is a burgeoning literature on this point. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as 
a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist 
Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 530-
49 (2007); LORNA FOX, CONCEPTUALIZING HOME: THEORIES, LAWS AND POLICIES 
142-77 (2007). 
 6  These possibilities are often cast in terms of a limited slate of recognized tenure forms, 
such as the leasehold, the life estate, and the fee simple. This limited menu, and the 
numerus clausus principle it embodies, has been the focus of a great deal of scholarly 
attention. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1 (2000); Nestor Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008). 
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This essay proceeds in two parts. Part I considers a variety of 
dimensions along which housing packages can vary and notes the ways 
in which the law may restrict or burden particular configurations. Part II 
examines how a home’s physical, spatial, and conceptual boundaries 
might be optimized, posing questions analogous to those that Ronald 
Coase asked about firms and that Robert Ellickson and Harold Demsetz 
asked about property holdings more generally.7 
I. Housing Packages 
At its most essential, a home is a vehicle for delivering a 
specialized stream of consumption benefits to its occupants. 8 
Arrangements that fit within the usual meaning of “home” give a 
household9 a variety of temporally extended rights, good against the rest 
of the world, to a physical structure that affords some measure of shelter, 
                                                        
 
 7  See Coase, supra note 3 (addressing firm boundaries). Robert Ellickson, following 
Harold Demsetz, translated Coase’s question about firm boundaries explicitly into the 
property realm by asking about the appropriate physical and conceptual boundaries of 
land holdings. Ellickson, supra note 3; see Demsetz supra note 3. Ellickson later 
engaged in a detailed economic analysis of households that, together with the earlier 
analysis of property in land, informs the analysis here. See generally ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH (2008); Robert 
C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 
116 YALE L.J. 226 (2006). 
 8  The home may also deliver investment returns to its occupants, depending on tenure 
form. See infra Part I.C.2.  
 9  A household might be an individual, a family unit, or any other small and relatively 
stable grouping that elects to regularly share housing and perhaps meals. Robert 
Ellickson offers a definition that shifts attention from the occupants themselves to the 
arrangements they have made with each other. See Ellickson, supra note 7, at 230 
(“ ‘household’ is a set of institutional arrangements, formal or informal, that governs 
relations among the owners and occupants of a dwelling space where occupants 
usually sleep and share meals”). 
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security, and privacy. 10  For example, the occupying household 11 
generally has the right to enter and leave the structure at times of its 
choosing, to control who else enters the structure and what they do while 
there, to store and display objects within the structure, and to engage in 
any of a fairly broad and unspecified set of uses in and immediately 
around the structure without first having to seek any outsider’s 
approval.12 The home also serves as a physically tethered delivery 
portal for additional consumption streams that emanate from outside the 
property’s boundaries, including local public goods and services, and all 
the other benefits (and detriments) associated with a particular spatial 
location.13 Typically, the occupants will also have some formal or 
informal rights over externality-generating uses that others might make 
of nearby properties.14 
                                                        
 
10  See, e.g., Barros, supra note 5, at 259-75 (discussing elements of “security, liberty, 
and privacy” in the home). 
11  Some complications are suppressed here by referring to “the occupying household” as 
if it were a monolith. Internal rules or other governance mechanisms commonly 
operate within the household to extend or withdraw certain rights to certain household 
members and to manage their use of the common areas. See Ellickson, supra note 7, 
at 297-323 (analyzing a broad array of such mechanisms for governing relationships 
among co-occupants). 
12  Property ownership has been associated with a large and unspecified set of uses. See, 
e.g., Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 2, at 1759-60 (noting the many 
unspecified ways that an owner can use a house); see also J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY 
AND JUSTICE 65 (1996) (emphasizing the “countless” ways an owner is entitled to 
“use, abuse, exploit, or transmit” property). While the choice set open to a leaseholder 
may be smaller than that afforded a homeowner, the same principle applies insofar as 
many uses can be selected without having to obtain preapproval. 
13  The Tiebout Hypothesis stands for the idea that residents select bundles of local goods 
and services by choosing where to locate. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE 
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 25-44 (2009) 
(examining the bundled package that comprises the home, including many elements 
that lie outside the physical structure or parcel). 
14  Common law nuisance principles allow owners to enjoin or receive damages for 
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Despite these commonalities, housing entitlements vary widely. 
What ends up inside or outside a given housing bundle depends on a 
complex interplay between legal restrictions, market forces, and 
household responses. I will start by considering the various dimensions 
of housing bundles, and the many ways in which law may restrict their 
content and configuration. 
A. Quantitative Dimensions 
As an initial cut, property holdings can be defined by reference to 
their size in space and their length in time. Law frequently regulates both 
dimensions in the housing context. 
1. Space 
Real property exists in space and is intuitively defined by its size 
and shape. Legal systems regulate and impact spatial configurations in 
many ways. The shape of property holdings can depend on the way in 
which land is demarcated,15 and on the way in which vertical space is 
attached to or detached from surface rights.16 The law also frequently 
sets spatial requirements for residential property. For example, many 
municipal zoning ordinances and private neighborhood covenants 
specify that homes must sit on lots of a certain minimum size. Cities also 
                                                                                                                              
 
certain kinds of impact-causing uses, while finer-grained land use controls like zoning 
and covenants may add many more limits. 
15  See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. 
Smith eds., 2011). 
16  See, e.g., STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL 
AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON (2008) (tracing the interaction between 
the ad coelum doctrine and the demands of air travel); Ellickson, supra note 3, at 
1363-64 (describing “vertical boundaries” for property holdings). 
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set minimum square footages for rental units.17 Building codes that 
require ceilings of a certain height or laws that require ownership of 
surface rights to be bundled with sufficient underground support set 
minima in vertical space. 
Some regulations influence space indirectly. Housing codes and fire 
codes that specify the maximum occupancy for a given space have the 
effect of requiring a minimum amount of space for each household of a 
given size. Limits on use can also preclude spatial subdivision. Thus, in 
an area zoned for single family homes, it is impermissible to subdivide a 
house and sell separate portions to different families. Spatial maxima 
might also be specified. For example, homeowners fed up with 
“McMansions” have been successful in imposing size limits for 
dwellings in some communities, typically tied to lot size.18 Measures to 
limit home energy usage that are tied to housing size, like the one in 
Boulder County, Colorado, effectively place a tax on larger homes.19 
                                                        
 
17  A surge of recent interest in small housing units has led to reexamination of some 
such minima.  See Venessa Wong, Will the Middle Class Want Micro-Apartments? 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/printer/ 
articles/92394-will-the-middle-class-want-micro-apartments (reporting on the recent 
reduction in the minimum size of apartments in San Francisco from 290 square feet to 
220 square feet); id. (noting that the minimum apartment size of 400 square feet has 
been waived in New York City to allow for construction of the winning development 
in Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s recent micro-apartment design competition); see also 
Tom Orlik & Esther Fung, In China, a Move to Tiny Living Space, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
17, 2012 (reporting on a Dongguan developer’s model apartment that “measures 160 
square feet, about the size of a parking space”). 
18  These restrictions, unlike the environmentally motivated measures discussed infra, are 
generally designed to keep owners from erecting a house that is deemed too large for 
its lot rather than to restrict size as an absolute matter. Because owners would not be 
precluded from building larger houses if they bought more land to build it on, these 
restrictions could be characterized as imposing (lot size) spatial minima rather than 
(square footage) spatial maxima. 
19  See Allyson Wendt, Boulder County Limits Energy Use for Homes, ENVIRONMENTAL 
BUILDING NEWS (May 1, 2008), http://www.buildinggreen.com/auth/article.cfm/2008/ 
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As these examples suggest, spatial requirements may be imposed to 
solve collective action problems of various sorts. Local public goods like 
“a compact, walkable neighborhood” or “a neighborhood with a 
spacious, open feel” may be achieved by restricting spatial 
configurations. Other explanations for mandated lot or home sizes have 
nothing to do with space as such. For example, spatial minima might be 
applied to screen on wealth or to ensure a certain property tax 
contribution.20 Such restrictions may push housing to a physical scale 
that impedes the production of local public goods such as a dense and 
walkable neighborhood, or, at a larger scale, a metropolitan area that is 
compact to traverse. 
In other instances, spatial restrictions may be designed to head off 
trouble down the road. For example, Michael Heller has suggested that 
legally mandated spatial minima can forestall the difficult bargaining 
problems that might result from later attempts to aggregate 
entitlements.21 Similarly, spatial minima, coupled with certain limits on 
uses at the property edges, might minimize future conflicts over cross-
border spillovers. Put a different way, and following a geometric point 
that has been made about fencing,22 physically large property holdings 
economize on edges, which are the membranes through which 
                                                                                                                              
 
4/29/Boulder-County-Limits-Energy-Use-for-Homes/ (describing the Boulder County 
BuildSmart program and the City of Boulder’s Green Points program). Boulder 
subsequently amended the program to make it less stringent. 
20  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2005) (discussing and citing literature on possible motivations for 
zoning measures that have the effect of excluding low- and moderate-income 
households). 
21  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 
1173 (1999). 
22  See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1332. 
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externalities spill out—and in. 
Conversely, legally prescribed spatial maxima may reflect a 
concern for not “overdrawing” a common supply of available land (or 
associated resources), where a viable pricing mechanism does not exist, 
or is not employed for distributive reasons. Spatial maxima might also 
be imposed indirectly, as through “use it or lose it” doctrines that are 
costly to satisfy for large holdings. Legal rules or enforcement practices 
that enable squatters to occupy unmonitored land may similarly have the 
effect of making large holdings more costly to retain, while at the same 
time carving out new residential holdings from existing property 
bundles.23 
2. Time 
Property is, by its nature, an enduring institution. The fee simple 
absolute, the most complete of the estates in land, extends forward 
indefinitely. Making property more expansive in time serves much the 
same purpose as making it more expansive in space: externalities are 
internalized as owners trade off the current and future benefits of 
particular actions.24 Yet temporal scaling can be as important as spatial 
scaling to optimizing the use of property, especially where residential 
purposes are contemplated. Leaseholds consciously slice off temporally 
bounded property rights and alienate them to possessors. Similarly, free 
                                                        
 
23  See Modder East Squatters & Others v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2004 (8) 
BCLR 821 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (holding that 40,000 illegal occupiers living in thousands 
of informal dwellings on about 50 hectares of a landowner’s property could not be 
displaced until the government provided alternative property for them, but ordering 
compensation for the landowner) discussed in Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 786-91 (2009). 
24  See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 3, at 355; Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1364-71. 
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alienability of housing allows owners to temporally tailor their property 
rights to fit their selected length of use, simply by lopping off the 
unneeded future portion and transferring it to someone else. 
Land use controls can place limits on temporal as well as spatial 
configurations. For example, owners may face restrictions or 
prohibitions on leasing out their homes.25 While such measures do not 
explicitly specify temporal minima—owners remain free to sell their 
properties outright—they do have the practical effect of extending 
ownership in time given the costs associated with completing a sales 
transaction. A flat ban on the alienability of property would preclude 
formal temporal slicing altogether, although the limited life spans of 
human beings would effectively accomplish a rough form of slicing. 
Where limited periods of possession can be transferred through leases, 
the law may dictate certain temporal minima or maxima, and may even 
specify that only the tenant, and not her landlord, may later truncate that 
time span.26 
B. Qualitative Dimensions 
The extent of a property interest depends not only on its physical 
                                                        
 
25  See, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to 
Promote Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 46-61 (2009) 
(describing a variety of rental restrictions implemented by local governments and 
private developers, including municipal bans on short-term rentals in vacation 
destinations); Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Community 
Associations: Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
223, 224 (2009) (noting prevalence of restrictions on leasing in common interest 
communities). 
26  Rent control ordinances take this basic form by requiring that tenants be given an 
entitlement to remain indefinitely, subject only to limited exceptions and to the 
tenant’s own decision to leave. In other words, the law requires that both an open-
ended time span and the means with which to cut it short be conveyed together to the 
leaseholder. 
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size and temporal length, but also on what it permits, forbids, or requires 
the owners or occupants to do. 
1. Use Restrictions 
In nearly all sizable U.S. cities, zoning constrains the range of 
permissible uses.27  In the residential context, zoning can operate with 
great specificity. Separate zones might be established, for example, for 
single family homes on half-acre lots, single family homes on smaller 
lots, duplexes, triplexes, small apartment buildings, and large apartment 
complexes. There are often fairly rigid limits on what ancillary uses may 
be made of property that is zoned residential, with home businesses and 
accessory dwellings like garage apartments often presenting difficult 
boundary issues. 
As Peter Colwell has observed, functional rights in land use interact 
in interesting ways with choices about the spatial extent of property 
rights. More uses can be permitted the larger the area under the control 
of a single owner, at least as long as edges can be managed 
appropriately.28 It is interesting, then, that zoning often couples tight use 
controls with spatial minima that seem to be in excess of what 
individuals would demand if left to their own devices.29 Meanwhile, 
                                                        
 
27  Houston, Texas remains the notable exception.   
28  Peter Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL 
ESTATE ECON. 525, 529 n.6 (1997) (“Another alternative [to zoning] would be to 
allow developers to do anything they want as long as they have some minimum scale, 
for example 640 acres, and as long as they do certain things at the edges of their 
developments (e.g., build very tall berms). Since the developers would internalize 
most of the externalities produced, their internal zoning could be expected to 
approach the optimal zoning.”). 
29  The distortionary effects of spatial minima, especially in the context of large lot sizes, 
have received attention. See, e.g., Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s Steep 
Price, REGULATION, Fall 2002, at 24; ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS 
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tight use controls make it more difficult for any excess spatial capacity to 
be used productively. 
A similar point might be made about temporally extended property 
interests. As the law of waste suggests, stricter functional limits must be 
placed on temporally limited estates, such as life estates, to keep current 
possessors from offloading costs onto later possessors. Making holdings 
larger in time and space does not resolve all issues about uses, but it does 
tend to privatize the management of those issues. 
2. Minimum Standards 
While use restrictions chip away at what an owner may do, other 
legal restrictions mandate what an owner must do. Such restrictions are 
prevalent in the housing context, whether prompted by externalities, 
paternalism, or concerns about bargaining imbalances, information 
asymmetries, or cognitive biases. Housing codes as well as the implied 
warranty of habitability set minimum quality standards for rental 
housing. Owner occupied properties are also subject to code 
requirements that specify standards for electrical and plumbing systems 
and that demand other sorts of upkeep and maintenance. Zoning 
restrictions and private residential covenants may require compliance 
with certain aesthetic standards in matters of exterior decoration, lawn 
care, fencing, and so on. 
Some housing restrictions might be aimed at producing network 
effects across neighborhoods or communities that parties acting 
independently would have difficulty producing. This rationale has been 
                                                                                                                              
 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 185-88 (2005) (citing and 
discussing the findings of Glaeser & Gyourko). 
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offered, for example, in the context of accessibility features for people 
with disabilities: a world in which all properties are accessible is a very 
different one to navigate than a world in which accessibility is hit or 
miss, and there may well be nonlinearities associated with reaching 
certain thresholds of widespread accessibility. 30  Other aspects of 
housing law, such as rent control, might be directed at preserving 
community networks against the threat of dispersion.31 
C. Risk and Returns 
Housing packages vary not only along the quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions just mentioned, but also in their allocation of 
risks and returns. 
1. Reconfiguration and Transfer Surplus 
Property in housing, like other forms of property, changes hands. If 
the transaction is an efficient one, the property is more valuable in the 
new hands than it was in the old hands.32 Who will get the associated 
surplus? In the case of ordinary market transactions involving fee 
interests, negotiation will determine the division of the gains from trade, 
                                                        
 
30  See David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 47, 98 (noting the possibility that private architectural choices regarding 
accessibility could have network effects); Robin Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design: 
Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2009) (arguing 
for “inclusive design standards” for single-family homes). 
31  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 
369 (1986) (discussing this rationale for rent control). 
32  On the other hand, the transfer might be inefficient, with the property ending up in the 
hands of a lower-valuing user. This result might occur if nonmarket processes (like 
eminent domain) were used to accomplish an involuntary shift that did not account for 
the takee’s full value in the holding. It could also occur through market processes due 
to factors like information asymmetries, cognitive biases, or liquidity problems. In 
such cases, there would be no surplus from the transfer, and the question becomes one 
of who will bear the loss. 
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based on the negotiating skills and outside options of the parties. 
Not all transfers involve selling an entire fee interest outright. For 
example, owners can produce property in housing by subdividing larger 
fee interests into shorter-or longer-term leases or life estates. The surplus 
thereby produced will be divided in market-mediated or legally 
prescribed ways. For example, if a leasehold is inalienable, the tenant 
will not be able to enjoy any gains that might be produced by creating 
and conveying yet smaller time slices.33 Nor does the tenant typically 
have any claim on surplus produced at the end of the leasehold, when 
possession is transferred to someone else. In the case of an ordinary 
leasehold, then, the tenure form dictates the later division of surplus. 
Similarly, property (currently) in housing may be aggregated to 
produce surplus. If holdout problems impede efforts at aggregation, 
eminent domain may be employed to overcome the deadlock.34 Where 
only fair market value is paid to the homeowners, the surplus from the 
aggregation (the assembly premium), goes entirely to the government or 
to the party to whom the property is reconveyed (depending on the terms 
of the reconveyance).35 Eminent domain might also be used to move 
                                                        
 
33  The statement in the text assumes that the parties will comply with the legal 
restriction, which may not always be the case. 
34  The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits eminent domain to takings for 
public use, which rules out purely private transfers from A to B. Nonetheless, a site 
can be condemned for redevelopment and transferred to another private party where 
this will serve a public purpose. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005). 
35  This assumes that fair market value is below the landowner’s reservation price—a 
reasonable assumption for any landowner who does not already have the property on 
the market. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 859, 866 (noting that owners’ consumer surplus in condemnation cases 
“has to be positive, for otherwise owners would already have sold their holdings on 
the market.”). 
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residential property from one party to another, even where no assembly 
is required.36 In this case, as with land assembly, the surplus would go 
the condemning authority or to those to whom it retransfers. 
Changes in the uses to which property can be put may also produce 
surpluses, relative to the existing baseline. For example, a parcel of land 
that is zoned residential may become much more valuable if it is rezoned 
for commercial use. Because zoning is not sold on the open market, the 
division of surplus will depend on the set of monetary and nonmonetary 
expenditures necessary to bring about the zoning change, as well as on 
the incidence of any externalities generated by the change.37 
2. Investment Risk 
In addition to serving as occasions for dividing up surplus, transfers 
serve as trigger points for realizing market gains and losses on housing 
investments. The issues are related but distinct: surplus division goes to 
the relationship between the parties’ reservation prices and their payoffs 
in the present transaction, while investment gains and losses go to the 
relationship between the sales price in the current transaction and the 
acquisition price in the previous transaction. It is entirely possible for a 
homeowner to enjoy an investment gain while garnering none of the 
surplus from a transfer,38 or to suffer an investment loss but nonetheless 
                                                        
 
36  Again, this might be done to get around “thin market” problems and associated 
monopoly dynamics. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 76 (1986). 
37  For a discussion of how dealmaking over land use rights differs from market 
exchange, see, e.g., BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 182-85 (2005). 
38  For example, an eminent domain proceeding might deliver none of the assembly or 
transfer surplus to the owner of the condemned property (and indeed might not even 
produce surplus at all), but could nonetheless return to the owner a gain on her 
investment in the home, relative to what she paid for it. 
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obtain surplus from a transfer.39 Like chances at surplus, investment risk 
is almost invariably bundled with freeholds and virtually never bundled 
with leaseholds. But things need not operate this way, and there have 
been a number of proposals that would rearrange risk, whether by 
subtracting appreciation potential, downside risk, or both, from 
homeowners’ bundles,40 or adding an investment stake to the holdings 
of renters.41 
3. Losses Due to Appropriation and Legal Change 
Property may be appropriated by governmental bodies or may lose 
value as a result of legal change. Moreover, depending on legal 
restrictions as well as enforcement levels and penalties, property may be 
subject to appropriation or devaluation by other private actors.42 An 
                                                        
 
39  This could occur when local economic conditions cause the home’s market value to 
decline, but also cause the home’s value to the Sellers to decline even more (if, for 
example, they have lost employment in the area and must move elsewhere to find a 
job). Thus, the Buyers may currently value the home more than the Sellers do, but less 
than the Sellers valued the home in the previous transaction under different market 
conditions. 
40  For discussion of existing and proposed models, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, 
Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008). 
41  See Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood 
Improvement while Protecting Low-Income Families 2-3 (Urban Institute Opportunity 
and Ownership Project No. 8, 2007), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/ 
311457.html (proposing financial options indexed to area rents be made available to 
tenants); O’FLAHERTY, supra note 37, at 369 (“Tenants could get a long-run stake in 
the community if they were required to buy some variety of security that was pegged 
to the town’s or neighborhood’s total property value.”); see also Lee Anne Fennell & 
Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (2010) (examining 
how local governments might be involved in implementing such proposals). 
42  Consider here adverse possession, prescriptive easements, and statutory mechanisms 
for condemning private rights of way for accessing landlocked parcels. In addition to 
these legally approved mechanisms for transferring property, unapproved transfers 
may occur due to the lack of enforcement. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Exchange 
and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 17-18 (1964). 
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important question, which crops up with special salience in the housing 
context, is who should bear the associated risks. Where eminent domain 
is employed and compensation is full, the community as a whole covers 
the risk to a homeowner.43  Where eminent domain systematically 
undercompensates homeowners, the risk is shared: the household bears 
the risk of losing the difference between the compensation amount and 
her reservation price, but the community insures against the taking up to 
the amount of compensation paid. Owners bear the risk of 
uncompensated appropriations and of many legal changes that reduce 
property value,44 except to the extent that private arrangements with 
third parties buffer this risk.45 
                                                        
 
43  Thus, as has been well noted, takings compensation operates as a form of insurance 
against legal change. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry 
Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 Q. J. Econ. 71 
(1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: 
Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 269 (1988). 
44  The law surrounding regulatory takings is a complex mix of per se and balancing 
rules. Regulations that work even a trivial permanent physical occupation are always 
considered compensable takings. Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
Likewise, an elimination of all economically viable use that is not a function of 
background limitations on title will always be a compensable taking. Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Regulations that impact property but 
do not fit within these per se rules are subject to Penn Central’s multi-factor analysis 
and may or may not be takings that require just compensation. Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see Lingle v. Chevron, 
544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (reiterating the Penn Central factors). 
45  The possibility of private takings insurance has been discussed in the academic 
literature. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just 
Compensation” Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 499-521 (2003); Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A 
Torts Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1238-47, 1270-72 
(1994); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 527-28, 537-49, 602-06 (1986). There is also an implicit form of insurance in 
place where a lender (and hence the pool of other creditors) will effectively bear part 
of the loss associated with a large drop in value. 
《中研院法學期刊》第12期（2013年3月） 
 
48 
The law can also heighten or reduce the risk of private 
appropriation (as through trespass and nuisance) by selecting 
enforcement levels and penalties. Owners must bear the risk of 
unremediated private appropriations, or obtain private insurance to cover 
those risks. 
4. Other Dispossession Risks 
The risk of dispossession looms large in housing policy. Aside from 
the forms of appropriation discussed above, households may be forced to 
move due to a foreclosure, eviction, or rent increase. The law manages 
these risks in a variety of ways, often by directly constricting the ability 
of parties to engage in certain kinds of transactions. For example, rent 
control statutes confer (with some exceptions) unlimited tenure at 
controlled rental amounts, and these protections are not waivable. Limits 
on credit or on the availability of foreclosure similarly reduce the risk of 
dispossession that households can take on. All such measures, by 
reducing the control that parties other than the occupants have over the 
length of the housing stay, help to confer a valuable option to remain—
an option that arguably is the single most important element in 
constructing what is meant by “home.”46 But like other measures that 
enrich housing packages, protections against dispossession carry 
potential downsides in the form of reduced access to housing in the first 
place. 
                                                        
 
46  See Lee Anne Fennell, Possession Puzzles, in 11-1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 
WFL10-1 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2010) (discussing the significance of the 
possessory option). On the importance of the right to remain, see Radin, supra note 31, 
at 359-63, 368-70; Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law 
Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. 
L. REV. 817, 820-29 (2008). 
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D. Complementarities and Scale 
The discussion to this point has emphasized that the home can be 
configured in many ways, and that private decisions and legal 
restrictions interact to determine the shape and contents of the 
entitlement package. Yet we do not see all possible combinations. Some 
possibilities (like a too-small rental unit or a too-risky mortgage) may be 
outlawed, while other combinations may simply fail to emerge. The 
reason we see some packages and not others may implicate 
complementarities and indivisibilities—or, to use a more evocative term, 
“lumpiness.”47 For example, a half-constructed house is not half as 
valuable as a completed house, even if it costs half as much to build.48 
We might find that other physical and functional characteristics, as well 
as certain sets of rights, are strongly complementary in delivering what 
counts as a “home,” so that removing any one of them dramatically 
reduces the value of the remaining components. Indeed, it is even 
                                                        
 
47  Lumpy goods do not deliver utility in smoothly increasing increments but rather in 
discontinuous jumps. See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and 
Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350 
(1982); Russell Hardin, Group Provision of Step Goods, 21 BEHAV. SCI. 101 (1976); 
Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. 
& PHIL. 245 (1987). The notion of lumpiness can be easily illustrated by a bridge over 
a chasm. If the bridge requires ten segments to span the void, the first nine segments 
of the bridge deliver no utility at all (except perhaps as unusual urban art). The tenth, 
however, suddenly produces a huge step-up in utility. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (citing the standard bridge example but noting its 
limits as an illustration of a step good, given that bridges can vary widely in cost and 
quality). For further discussion of lumpiness as it applies to property law and theory, 
see Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2012). 
48  Interestingly, this very fact may offer insight into otherwise puzzling patterns of 
behavior, including the use of partially completed homes as savings vehicles. See 
ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING 
OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 183-84 (2011) (explaining that families in 
many developing countries invest in home-construction efforts that extend over long 
spans of time, and hinting at possible explanations related to precommitment). 
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possible to understand certain risk and return packages in this way, if one 
supposes that homeownership necessarily requires risking property value 
losses and pursuing gains. 
Ultimately, the questions are empirical ones. How does utility grow 
or shrink as elements are added to or subtracted from housing bundles? 
Do nonlinearities make additions or subtractions to the bundle useful 
only if made in certain discrete chunks? Answering these questions leads 
us to examine why it matters whether some particular element is 
included or not included within the household’s ownership envelope. In 
important ways, one’s home is constructed not only of the elements 
inside the dwelling, but of many other outside impacts and 
opportunities.49 Considered in this way, the home is always co-owned.50 
The larger question to which this essay is addressed, then, is how to 
manage that co-ownership. 
In the balance of this essay, I will focus on the boundaries of the 
household’s property interest in the home. For simplicity, I will refer to 
this interest as “the home” despite the fact that the value and the quality 
of the housing services the household receives, and the market value of 
the home itself, depend crucially on factors lying outside that property 
interest. Indeed, that is the point. We must consider the impact of 
                                                        
 
49  See FENNELL, supra note 13. 
50  Armen Alchian makes a similar observation: 
[I]f the property laws prohibit me from using things in ways that affect your 
welfare, then in a sense you are able to exercise through the law, control over my 
decisions as to what use will be made or of the thing of which I was called the 
“owner.” Who shall be called the owner? Me, or the rest of society? Isn’t everyone 
an owner in some sense or other, insofar as his interests are influenced in affecting 
the use to some degree by laws passed (in a democracy)? 
 ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, SOME ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY 25 (1961). 
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extending or constricting the private household’s holdings on 
interactions both within the household and between the household and 
those outside of it. For example, including a bathroom within a living 
unit avoids the need to queue up for a public restroom, and thus lessens 
the pressure on those public facilities. At the same time, by making the 
living unit more expensive, households may have to include more 
members, and this may lead to other problematic internal interactions 
across other dimensions. 
The next Part works through a theoretical framework for examining 
these kinds of tradeoffs.  
II. A Theory of the Home 
If we were going to construct a theory of the home analogous to 
Coase’s theory of the firm, how would we begin? We might start by 
considering the relevant scale (in time, space, and use) of the residential 
experience, and the sorts of complementary elements required to 
produce it. We could then turn to questions of boundary-drawing, 
recognizing that an expanded envelope will tend to require more internal 
management and less external transacting, and a constricted envelope 
will tend to require less internal management and more external 
transacting. Placing additional factors within the home provides option 
value and flexibility to occupants (for example, the washing machine 
can be used at a moment’s notice), but it is also expensive, and presents 
an opportunity cost associated with untapped excess capacity. 
Subpart A below begins with the question of efficient boundaries, 
drawing analogies to the work of Coase on firms and that of Ellickson 
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and Demsetz on land holdings. Subpart B addresses the problem of 
excess capacity and its alternatives. Subparts C and D consider how 
interactions between privately and commonly owned elements, and 
between elements owned by different parties, respectively, can generate 
potential incentive misalignments for the law to manage. 
A. Efficient Boundaries 
Before turning to the problem of efficient residential boundaries, it 
is helpful to briefly review some of the lessons of efficient boundaries in 
other contexts. 
1. Of Firms and Farms 
Ronald Coase launched an entire field of law and economics by 
asking a simple question: why are there firms?51 If transactions can 
always be arranged to procure all needed goods and services in all 
necessary combinations, the practice of grouping together certain 
elements within the envelope of a firm seems puzzling. The answer 
given by Coase and elaborated by scholars thereafter is that sometimes 
the costs of internal organization and management are lower than the 
costs of external transacting. To the extent (and only to the extent) that 
this is the case, firms are efficient. 
As Demsetz and Ellickson have shown, analogous points can be 
made about the size and scope of property entitlements. To simplify, 
property rights draw a circle around a resource and its owner or 
owners.52 This line marks off an interior space and, at the same time, 
                                                        
 
51  See Coase, supra note 3, at 37 (“Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges 
at all in a specialized exchange economy.”).  
52  Cf. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (“Property 
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creates an outward-facing shell. The concept of property is closely 
associated with this outer shell, which (for most purposes) commands 
the uninvited to keep off. Thus, Carol Rose has explained that a limited 
access commons is “property on the outside” to the extent that outsiders 
can be excluded.53 At the property line, the mode of property protection 
switches from (mostly) exclusion to governance.54 Within the interior 
space, common owners (if there are more than one) must determine how 
to use the resource. If the owners invite in tenants or employees or 
guests or licensees of various sorts, they must manage uses of the 
resource by these individuals as well. 
Owners face another sort of difficulty if they must interact with 
outsiders to achieve their goals for the property. Indeed, property itself 
can be understood as a technology for internalizing costs and benefits by 
(at least roughly) pairing inputs and outcomes.55 If many inputs must be 
gathered from other owners on a regular basis to carry out functions 
within the property holding, or if rights to the returns from activities on 
the property must be separately negotiated with outsiders in each 
instance, property cannot do its job effectively. Optimizing property 
holdings, then, requires that the boundary be pushed outward until the 
costs of dealing with outsiders56 are just equal to the costs of internally 
                                                                                                                              
 
draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or organization. Within 
that circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without.”). 
53  See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998). 
54  See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S456 (2002). 
55  See Demsetz, supra note 3 (explaining how property rights can internalize externalities 
where it is worth the cost of doing so). 
56  I use the phrase “costs of dealing with outsiders” here in place of the usual term 
“transaction costs” because the law's protection of property rights are an important 
and costly element of this interaction with outsiders. If “transaction costs” are read 
《中研院法學期刊》第12期（2013年3月） 
 
54 
managing the holding.57 Deciding where to place the boundary depends 
on the scale of the activities that an owner wishes to undertake. 
An owner may not select optimal boundaries if she does not 
internalize all of the costs and benefits of boundary placement. The 
resource management that takes place on the inside of a property holding 
is largely privatized, while public enforcement plays a lead role in 
enforcing exclusion from the outer boundaries and in otherwise 
managing impacts that emanate from outside the property’s edges. 
Choosing to expand the property envelope, then, may reduce the need 
for costly interactions with outsiders, but it may also mean giving up 
what amounts to a public subsidy for those interactions. The placement 
of temporal and conceptual boundaries around property holdings 
implicates similar efficiency questions. In each case, it is necessary to 
examine not only where efficiency would mandate locating the boundary, 
but also how implicit or explicit subsidies or penalties imposed by law 
can alter the private calculus in ways that correct for or produce 
inefficiencies. 
Also significant is the fact that property arrangements can rarely, if 
ever, be reduced to a single “inside” and “outside.” Packages of 
ownership are typically nested within each other in complex ways.58 
                                                                                                                              
 
broadly enough to include the costs of avoiding unwanted transactions, then the term 
would be apt, but not everyone understands the term in this way. See Lee Anne 
Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at section I.B.2). 
57  Cf. Coase, supra note 3, at 44 (explaining that “a firm will tend to expand until the 
costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of 
carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the 
costs of organizing in another firm”). 
58  Cf. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 101-02 (1990) (discussing the “nesting” of different levels 
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Private property rights appear within collectives. Even in a household or 
other shared living context, individuals have their own possessions and 
often their own sleeping quarters. At a larger scale, a neighborhood may 
share many elements in common, but the homes themselves are privately 
owned by individual households. Likewise, collectives appear within 
private property holdings. A privately owned home often contains 
multiple members who share certain spaces and amenities, and a private 
development or private club (or any other “limited access commons”) 
will operate like a commons on the inside even as it appears to the outer 
world as private property.59 Many more complexly nested private-
private and collective-collective arrangements exist. 
As these examples suggest, privately and commonly held elements 
often interact within the same spatial area, and can produce incentive 
misalignments. The classic example is Garrett Hardin’s parable of 
overgrazing herds.60 What creates the incentive for herdspeople to add 
an inefficient number of cattle to a common grazing land is not simply 
the fact that the grazing land is held in common; rather it is the abutment 
between the privately owned cattle and the commonly held land.61 
Managing such abutments among ownership types is as central to 
property law as is managing the relationships between owners and 
                                                                                                                              
 
of governance). 
59  See Rose, supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
60  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, N.S. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
61  See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. 
ECON. HIST. 16, 22-23 (1973) (observing that such an “incongruity between ownership 
opportunities” can create problematic incentives); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, 
Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
PROPERTY LAW 35, 37-38 & n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) 
(noting that the abutment of ownership forms generates tragedy, and citing literature 
on this point). 
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nonowners.62  
2. The Boundaries of the Home 
The home can be understood as a special case of the same 
boundary-drawing exercises that have featured in the analysis of firms 
and landholdings. What should go inside and outside of the spatial, 
temporal, and conceptual package known as a home depends on the 
scale of the underlying activities—the set of “residential services”63 that 
property rights deliver to households. 
Spatial scale in the residential context is trickier than it appears. 
How much space a given household finds necessary for its well-being 
depends on the cultural context64 and on which activities are contained 
within the household, as opposed to being socialized within a larger 
community or procured privately outside the home. As the “home” 
sphere shrinks—at the limit, to the size of a sleeping pod—more and 
more functions are pushed to the outside.65 Conversely, larger homes 
may draw within their compass amenities like swimming pools, libraries, 
                                                        
 
62  When multiple activities are pursued simultaneously at different scales, the problem 
of managing mixed property becomes quite complex, and may require measures 
designed to counter strategic misbehavior. See generally Henry E. Smith, Semicommon 
Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000) 
(examining these points in the context of medieval common fields that were used both 
for private farming and for common grazing). 
63  I am analogizing here to the literature on “ecosystem services,” which recognizes 
multiple streams of benefits that flow from ecological features.  
64  For example, the relative size and quality of one’s home may matter more to one’s 
well-being than its absolute size and quality. See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 
10 (1999). 
65  As this example suggests, there may be nested layers of “outside,” such as the 
common areas in hotels, condominiums, and private residential communities that are 
shared by insiders but that exclude outsiders. Similarly, a large private home may 
contain many spaces within it that by agreement or convention will be largely under 
the control of a subset of the household, or even a single member. 
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and observatories that are more commonly shared with people outside 
the household. 
Consider, for example, cohousing communities in which some of 
the functions commonly associated with the individual dwelling unit—
cooking, eating, and relaxing with friends and family—are performed in 
common kitchens and socialization spaces. 66  Likewise, dormitory 
rooms might be made intentionally small to encourage students to use 
common study rooms and socializing areas. Shared bathrooms located 
outside the residential unit can be found in many places as well, from 
Beijing hutongs to the Lawn residences at the University of Virginia.67 
Exterior portions of the home, from private backyards to front porches, 
bring functions within the boundary of the private owner’s holding that 
might instead be pursued in public parks or town squares. 
Privately provided substitutes for certain functions of the home also 
abound. Storage spaces outside of the home, from off-site garages to safe 
deposit boxes to rented storage units, can reduce the amount of space 
within the home that is devoted to archiving and preserving one’s goods. 
Private gyms provide exercise and bathing facilities, and restaurants and 
bars offer food and beverage services outside the home. Private 
entertainments outside the home can substitute for those in the home. 
                                                        
 
66  See Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, Process, and Design: Cohousing and the 
Contemporary Common Interest Community, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3, 11-12 
(1999) (describing cohousing “common houses” which typically include kitchen and 
dining areas, workshops, meeting rooms, and playroom, and thus “provide not only 
extra rooms that are either left out of or reduced in size in the individual dwellings, 
but also facilities that will attract activities shared by the entire community.”). 
67  See Liu Chang, Bathrooms for Hutong Dwellers Planned, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 5, 
2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/05/content_359010.htm; 
Living on the Lawn FAQs, U. VA. OFF. DEANS STUDENTS, http://www.virginia.edu/ 
deanofstudents/lawnapplication/lawnlifefaqs.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
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Laundromats offer washing and drying services that households could 
instead provide through the ownership of their own machines. Hotels 
and other private sleeping spaces can be procured in the private market 
as well. That these private alternatives are rarely pursued in 
combinations that make the home superfluous over the long run does not 
undercut the essential mutability of the home’s space requirements, 
though it may shed light on what are thought to be the home’s core 
functions. 
Another input to the home’s physical size is household size, which 
is itself endogenous to the joint production tasks that will be 
accomplished inside the home.68 Because not all of these activities will 
be optimally conducted at the same scale, some judgment must be made 
about which ones are the most important (or most costly to address if 
mis-scaled). Arriving at the right answer to the “household size” 
question, for example, depends on the relative importance of those 
household products for which economies of scale are important, like 
space, heat, shelter, and meals, and those products, such as privacy, 
autonomy, and intimacy, for which there tend to be diseconomies of 
scale.69 An important limitation is the fact that housing is cumbersome 
to resize.70 Because it is not easy to add or subtract rooms, homes may 
                                                        
 
68  ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 76-84; Ellickson, supra note 7, at 287-92. 
69  See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 7, at 260, 287-92 (“Boosting the number of household 
occupants, for example, may reduce the per capita costs of providing goods and 
services such as heating, informal social insurance, and food. On the other hand, 
adding occupants may give rise to countervailing inefficiencies of scale, such as 
greater difficulty in governing behavior within the home.”) (footnote omitted); 
O’FLAHERTY, supra note 37, at 348-49 (comparing houses to “miniature cities” and 
examining tradeoffs between economies of scale in housing and concerns about 
congestion, security, coordination, and privacy). 
70  This rigidity is to some extent endogenous to existing social and legal arrangements. 
The key to making housing more flexible over time is the ability to subdivide or 
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often have excess capacity in order to accommodate peak loads, such as 
times when all children are at home, or when guests visit. 
Similar points might be made about temporal scale. Brief slices of 
possession can produce the basic goods of shelter and sleep, as 
evidenced by the fact that transient rights in hotel rooms, shelter beds, or 
friends’ couches can serve as substitutes in this domain. But larger 
temporal scales are necessary to internalize the costs and benefits of 
running a household, raising a family, contributing to a community, or 
getting a return on one’s investment in housing.71 If some functions that 
homes perform require longer temporal scales than others, then keeping 
those functions within the home will push outward the time envelope. 
Optimal temporal scale will be different for different households, and for 
the same household under different circumstances.72  The enduring 
                                                                                                                              
 
reaggregate living spaces within the same building or on the same lot. Zoning 
restrictions that do not permit accessory dwelling units present an impediment to this 
approach. For some proposed approaches to housing that would incorporate multiple 
accessory dwelling units, see Kelsey Keith, Architects Rethinking Housing for the 21st 
Century, CURBED (Nov. 17, 2011), http://ny.curbed.com/archives/2011/11/17/architects_ 
rethinking_housing_for_the_21st_century_city.php. 
71  There may, however, be ways to produce these larger scale effects in ways other than 
through long-term possession of the same home. For example, derivative instruments 
indexed to housing markets could allow people to invest in housing without the 
investment being concentrated in one’s own personal home, and such investments 
could obviously be held for a shorter or longer time than one chooses to possess any 
particular structure. Likewise, investment in a community could be facilitated by 
moves within the same neighborhood, where the array of housing stock makes this 
feasible. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 139 
(1961) (noting the ability of diverse city neighborhoods to accommodate changes in 
circumstances and thus allow people to “stay put” over time). 
72  We might assume that housing utility generally grows (or shrinks) in discontinuous 
ways as a function of time in place, as people become attached to (or tired of) a place. 
Because a wide range of personal and often subjective factors determine the utility 
associated with staying or leaving at a given temporal point, the occupiers of 
residential housing are likely to place high value on having control over when to cut 
short (or avoid having cut short) their possessory interest. 
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nature of many property interests in housing can be understood as 
embodying a presumption that possession today is strongly 
complementary with possession tomorrow—and next week and next 
month and next year. This saves the household from having to 
renegotiate possession every day or every week, but it also means that 
the household may end up with scraps of possessory time that it cannot 
use but that are too costly to alienate. 
Complementarities also come into play where use rights and quality 
standards are involved. For example, a residential use might be 
complementary with an in-home occupation like dog training. This 
complementarity might conflict, however, with other highly 
complementary rights over noise levels throughout the neighborhood 
(one loud kennel could disrupt the whole neighborhood). Likewise, a 
group of well-kept homes in proximity to each other will enjoy 
reciprocal gains that would not be available to any of them if they were 
scattered among other uses. 
Land use controls attempt to capture positive externalities and 
control negative externalities within neighborhoods or zones largely by 
limiting uses, but sometimes also by mandating quality (as where 
particular lawn care standards are specified within private communities). 
These restrictions allow individual households to own less land than if 
they had to buffer themselves and their neighbors from spillovers, and 
can enable the production of local public goods like a residential 
community with a particular aesthetic ambience. But these 
complementarities are not the only ones that must be considered. 
Creating spatial proximity among one set of uses (such as high-end 
residential homes) may interfere with the benefits of mixing business 
and residential uses, or of achieving economic integration among 
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residences, and thereby avoiding negative synergies associated with 
concentrated poverty. 
B. Excess Capacity, Sharing, and Procuring 
As the discussion above suggests, boundaries around the home may 
be drawn in ways that produce greater or lesser amounts of excess 
capacity in various domains. A large private backyard might be used just 
a few hours each week, a spare bedroom might be used a dozen days a 
year, and a kitchen oven might stand idle for days or even weeks. Some 
of the most basic residential services that a home provides, such as a 
place for human beings to eat, sleep, and be sheltered from the elements, 
may go unused for stretches of time while the home’s occupants are 
away at work or on vacation. Because these forms of excess capacity fall 
within the envelope of private ownership, outsiders cannot (usually) 
access the capacity without engaging in a transaction with the owner. 
Although such transactions do occur at times, and may have become 
more prevalent (or at least more visible) as a result of new technologies, 
they are often prohibitively costly.73 
Selling off slices of excess capacity (time inside my house during 
the day, for example) may also be inconsistent to a greater or lesser 
extent with other residential services that the home provides. For 
example, even when its occupants are away, the home continues to serve 
as a staging area for the temporarily suspended residential activities, 
                                                        
 
73  See, e.g., Penelope Green, Surfing the World Wide Couch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/20/garden/20couch.html (describing a social 
networking site that matches guests with hosts who have spare couches). For 
discussion of how excess capacity can be addressed through sharing in some contexts, 
see Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004). 
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allowing them to be seamlessly resumed upon the household’s return. 
The home serves as a continuous and exclusive storage and display unit 
as well, a place where sensitive items like pets, plants, artwork, and 
antiques can be maintained in appropriate conditions. It is a shell that 
can be policed from the outside in ways that make internal monitoring 
for theft and other forms of interference largely unnecessary.74 Excess 
capacity also translates into option value; a bathtub or a washing 
machine may be used relatively few hours per week, but it stands ready 
to be used whenever a household member wants to use it.75 
If excess household capacity is too difficult to transact over, 
whether because of the ways in which it intersects with capacity that is 
being actively used or for other reasons, it will stand idle. This result 
may be perfectly efficient; there may be no alternative arrangement that 
can deliver more value, given the costs of achieving it.76 Drawing the 
boundary lines more tightly can reduce the amount of excess capacity, 
but at the cost of producing a converse difficulty: spells of inadequate 
capacity that must be met through outsourcing transactions. For example, 
a household whose home lacks a spare bedroom may need to arrange for 
out-of-town guests to stay at a local hotel, and a household whose living 
spaces are too small for a party that it wishes to throw must secure an 
off-site party venue. 
As these examples suggest, demand for capacity is not exogenously 
given but may instead depend on capacity levels themselves. Thus, a 
                                                        
 
74  See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1327-28. 
75  I thank Scott Baker for discussions on this point. 
76  Cf. Peter Iliev & Ivo Welch, A Model of Operational Slack: The Short-Run, Medium-
Run, and Long-Run Consequences of Limited Attention Capacity, 29 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 2, 3 (2013) (discussing instances in which periods of idleness can be an “optimal 
design outcome” given the need to respond quickly during peak activity periods). 
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family whose home cannot hold a large party may decide not to hold the 
party at all, and a household without a spare bedroom may find that out-
of-town guests express less interest in visiting. Similarly, the family that 
gives up a backyard may lose its interest in spending time outdoors when 
this will require a trek to the local park. In some instances, the home’s 
excess capacity can be viewed as a form of precommitment to desired 
expenditures that will be too painful to bear at the margin.77 The ability 
to precommit to large blocks of service outside of the home (gym 
memberships, for example) can serve a similar precommitment 
function—or can at least attempt to do so.78 In other cases it may simply 
be efficient to excise certain functions from the home and not to replace 
them outside the home, if the loss is less than the cost of including them 
or procuring them separately. 
Sharing arrangements can attempt to address the twin problems of 
excess capacity and inadequate capacity by expanding the pool of users 
who are entitled to access the resource. Sharing commonly occurs 
among household members, and expanding the household increases 
opportunities for sharing. Other alternatives would include easing access 
for favored guests to share goods within private homes,79 or forming 
                                                        
 
77  Sometimes this difficulty can surmounted through clever forms of mental accounting. 
See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental 
Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 20 (1998) (relating the story 
of a couple that chose a less expensive apartment over one with closer access to good 
restaurants on the theory that the lower rent would more than pay for taxi rides to 
good restaurants, and who then set aside earmarked money for this purpose to ensure 
that the marginal cost of transportation would not derail their plans). 
78  Such efforts may not turn out to be as effective as envisioned. See Stefano DellaVigna 
& Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694 (2006) 
(finding that consumers who selected a monthly gym membership paid significantly 
more per visit than they would have paid on a pay-per-visit basis). 
79  New technologies may make this more feasible, although it is unclear how far the 
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larger clubs (such as private residential communities) for sharing goods 
outside the home. These arrangements cut down on excess capacity and 
on the need for formal transactions to transfer resources, but can 
introduce incentive difficulties of their own. 
C. Abutments between Privately and Commonly Owned Elements 
For the reasons just suggested, a smaller compass for the individual 
home may correspond to an enlarged common or public sphere in which 
access to resources is shared with those outside the household.80 This is 
because many of the substitutes for home-produced services like 
recreation exhibit jointness of supply: they are too large for any one 
person to procure on her own. Thus, households may avoid the costs 
associated with excess capacity in backyard space by forgoing the yard 
and spending time at a public park, where the shared atmosphere is 
governed by park rules rather than exclusionary rights.81 Even when 
goods like recreation or access to open space are procured privately in 
settings (like private clubs) from which outsiders can be excluded, the 
access must be allocated among the insiders in some fashion. It is 
                                                                                                                              
 
approach can be pushed. For instance, CLOO is a smartphone app that helps a user 
find a restroom in a private dwelling that she can use for a small fee, following a real-
time request that can be accepted or rejected. See Get a CLOO? App Will Rent Your 
Bathroom to Strangers, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
technology/2011/09/cloo-app-bathroom.html. 
80  Conversely, a larger compass for the individual home may mean less sharing with 
outsiders, but could potentially mean more sharing with other household members 
within the home (to the extent household size correlates positively with the size and 
scope of the home). Even if more household members are not added when the home 
takes on more functions, there may be a greater need for household employees or for 
other parties who enter the home to keep all of the amenities and facilities functional. 
This introduces internal management issues analogous to those found in the firm 
setting. 
81  See Smith, supra note 54 (discussing exclusion and governance strategies). 
Property in Housing 
 
65
certainly possible to propertize certain aspects of these shared goods, but 
important aspects of these goods will usually remain unpriced, and 
hence in a commons (as to the insiders). For example, campers in a state 
park may obtain possessory rights to a particular campsite while sharing 
access to hiking trails and bodies of water. 
This abutment between privately owned and commonly owned 
elements can produce misaligned incentives, as Hardin’s herdsman story 
illustrates. Yet it is impossible to avoid drawing the line between private 
and common elements somewhere. Even households that bring the 
widest imaginable set of functions within the envelope of the home still 
use roads, other sorts of infrastructure, and larger environments in 
common with others. Thus, a common resource (such as a road) may be 
overused as an input into a private consumption stream (such as that 
provided by a secluded homesite), just as a common field may be 
overused as an input into a privately owned cow. 
There are a variety of ways to address such incentive misalignments. 
For example, instead of leaving the siting choice for the home inside the 
owners’ package of rights, it might be subjected to a public 
decisonmaking process. 82  Alternatively, fees might be charged to 
homeowners that account for the costs associated with their siting 
decisions, or homeowners might be required to draw their home’s 
boundaries even more broadly so as to privately provide the last stretch 
of road to the home.83 Overdrawing the spatial commons (problematic, 
because it raises the costs of achieving agglomeration benefits) has 
                                                        
 
82  Zoning often accomplishes something like this, by limiting where development is 
permitted. 
83  Impact fees and requirements that new development occur within private 
neighborhoods that maintain their own roads illustrate these possibilities. 
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generally been associated with “sprawl” and hence with a particular 
aesthetic of residential life. But the basic problem of private impacts on 
common elements is not unique to any particular vision of housing or 
community. It would also be possible for property owners to demand 
more density than is socially efficient if the costs of managing it fell on 
others.84 
Another way to frame the problem is to recognize that the package 
of residential services that households consume is made up of elements 
that are most efficiently produced at different scales and under different 
ownership structures. Inputs to residential enjoyment include not only 
physical shelter but also relatively unpolluted air and workable 
infrastructure connecting homes to jobs and other points of interest—
elements that cannot be provided by individual households on their own. 
A useful theory of the home must account for these multiple efficient 
scales. Households must make, buy, or otherwise acquire (often through 
the political process) all of the strands that make up their residential 
experience. Decisions about how to configure the housing bundle is 
interdependent with the decisions of other households on these matters, 
and on the legal rules that manage the abutments between different 
entitlement holders and different ownership types. 
 
                                                        
 
84  There may also be a temporal analog to sprawl – the rigidity in physical and social 
arrangements that results from granting limitless possessory rights to owners. See T. 
Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of 
Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (noting, and suggesting 
charging for, “the diminution of social flexibility that results from putting immobile 
improvements on land”). Although eminent domain can be used to overcome an 
owner’s veto power, the costs (political and otherwise) of doing so is high. 
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D. Misalignments of Exposure and Control 
Although much of what I have said to this point has focused on 
questions of physical scale, the rules that govern risks and returns also 
play a central role in managing ownership abutments of other types. To 
take the simplest example, the landlord-tenant relationship divides the 
property entitlement in a way that leaves risks and returns with the 
landlord, while granting the tenant a consumption stream associated with 
a particular term of occupancy. As scholars have noted, there is moral 
hazard on both sides of this relationship, as the landlord will be willing 
to sacrifice aspects of the tenant’s consumption stream for higher returns, 
while the tenant will seek to maximize her own consumption stream 
even when it comes at the expense of the landlord’s investment 
interest.85 Landlord-tenant law, combined with a set of private practices 
(like credit screening and security deposits), tries to manage this 
abutment in ownership interests, but does so imperfectly. 
Homeownership resolves that source of conflict by consolidating in the 
household both the home’s consumption stream and its investment 
returns. But it introduces another seam in the ownership structure that 
produces new incentive misalignments. 
The homeowner’s residential experience and investment returns are 
both heavily influenced by factors lying outside of her individual 
household’s control.86  These include conditions in the surrounding 
block, neighborhood, community, and in locations further afield that 
affect employment, entertainment, and other opportunities. The package 
                                                        
 
85  See Derek K.Y. Chau, Michael Firth & Bin Srinidhi, Leases with Purchase Options 
and Double Moral Hazard, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1390, 1391 (2006). 
86  See generally FENNELL, supra note 13. 
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of local goods and services that the homeowner receives along with her 
residence, which are in turn influenced by the behaviors and preferences 
of her co-consumers, will also factor heavily into the value of the 
residential services the home provides. The scale at which these effects 
are produced is much larger than the maximum efficient scale for a 
household’s residential activities, and so it is typically managed by a 
collective through some type of governance arrangement, public or 
private. In an important sense, then, the neighborhood is a 
“semicommons” arrangement in which activities involving the same 
resource are undertaken at different scales and under different ownership 
regimes.87 Similarly mixed regimes may exist within the household. For 
example, students sharing a group house might occupy individual rooms 
for purposes of sleep and study on school nights, while throwing open 
the entire house for use as a party site on weekends—but not without 
potential moral hazard.88 
These abutments between differently scaled activities are addressed 
in various ways. Within the household, informal rules backed by norms 
may suffice. At the neighborhood level, other forms of governance 
                                                        
 
87  See Smith, supra note 62, at 132 (defining the semicommons as a property regime in 
which “both common and private uses are important and impact significantly on each 
other.”). 
88  The group house example given in the text replicates in some respects the medieval 
common field arrangement in which owners privately owned and cultivated strips of 
farmland but threw the entire area open for grazing during certain seasons. In the 
medieval common field context, thin, scattered strips may have helped to “strategy 
proof” the arrangement. See Smith, supra note 62. In a group house setting, stable 
private rights over relatively large chunks of space (rooms) could invite the offloading 
of costs onto others. A system of rotation for private bedrooms or perhaps a strategic 
dispersal of prized personal possessions throughout the house prior to each party 
could help to approximate the strategic advantages of the scattering arrangement in 
common fields. I thank my former Property students for discussions on this point. 
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emerge. Zoning, coupled with property taxation, forces minimum 
contributions from householders to support local public goods and 
services. Not only can zoning ensure that households contribute a 
minimum share of taxes,89 the restraints on density and intensity of use 
force residents to contribute in kind to particular local public goods, like 
a quiet, spacious, residential neighborhood. These monetary and in-kind 
contributions may also be managed through private common interest 
community structures, such as homeowners associations. 
These land use solutions effectively move the circle of homeowner 
control outward; in idealized form, they would produce the equivalent of 
a single-owner structure for the commonly held elements, much as oil 
unitization does.90 The fact that homeowners have such a large stake in 
their own investment returns makes them highly motivated and vocal 
participants in the local political process. 91  These high levels of 
homeowner involvement in issues that impact property values has been 
the cause of both celebration and consternation.92 On the positive side, 
homeowners with a stake in the community might be expected to do all 
they can to make the community as desirable as possible—taking into 
account both consumption and investment returns.93 Although there 
may be some misalignments even here (for example, between short-
                                                        
 
89  See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local 
Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975). 
90  Unitization allows a group of landowners to operate as a single unit in exploiting an 
oil or gas reserve and dividing up the proceeds. See generally Gary D. Libecap & 
James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United 
States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589 (2002). 
91  See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001). 
92  For discussion, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617 
(2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001)). 
93  See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 150; Jan K. Brueckner & Man-Soo Joo, Voting 
with Capitalization, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 453 (1991). 
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stayers who care more about maximizing investment returns and long-
timers who would gladly trade some portion of home value to preserve 
certain aspects of the community’s consumption experience that they 
uniquely value),94 most homeowners can get behind policies that will 
enhance property values. 
There are two problems, however. First, to the extent that 
homeowners as a group are highly risk averse, they may systematically 
avoid policies that have positive expected value but high variance.95 
The status quo may be suboptimally sticky as a result. Second, strong 
forms of neighborhood and community control introduce another 
potentially problematic abutment: between the factors contained within 
the local circle of control and those that influence many such circles of 
control simultaneously. From landfill siting to spatial layout to 
affordable housing, the impacts of local decisionmaking can have 
repercussions that extend beyond the boundaries of the local 
jurisdiction.96 Here, even risk neutral homeowners would rationally 
choose to offload costs on other communities whenever possible. 
Reducing the stake that individual homeowners hold in the portion of 
investment returns attributable to offsite factors would address both 
factors, although not without introducing another player in the 
ownership structure who will have her own incentives: the investor who 
would take on the risk shed by the homeowner.97 
The problems are complex ones that have been explored in greater 
                                                        
 
94  See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 150; Brueckner & Joo, supra note 93, at 464. 
95  See FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 9-11. 
96  See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1132-44, 1149-50 (1996). 
97  See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 1098-1109. 
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depth elsewhere. What the analysis here adds is a sensitivity to the 
places where one form of ownership meets another, or one entitlement 
holder’s interests run into those of other entitlement holders. These 
inevitable abutments can never be eliminated, but only managed. Doing 
so intelligently requires a great deal of careful thought about how 
residential life might be organized and how its component parts might be 
produced and distributed. 
Conclusion 
For all the attention that housing policy and the law and economics 
of property have separately received, a gulf has remained between them. 
In this essay, I have tried to make a start at bringing these areas together 
by thinking in an open-ended way about how property rights in housing 
might be configured. Applying boundary placement principles 
developed in other contexts can help to determine the efficient scope of 
the home. As a prerequisite, however, we must determine what jobs we 
want housing to do for us. Ultimately, answers to the question “how will 
housing be configured?” neither emanate entirely from top-down 
processes, nor grow entirely from the bottom up, but rather depend on a 
complex interaction between law, markets, and behavior. Although this 
essay has only scratched the surface in thinking about these interactions, 
I hope that it will prompt new thinking along these lines. 
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